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state tax notes™
The Implications of CSX and DMA
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
David Gamage is an assistant professor at the University of California
Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall),
and Darien Shanske is a professor at
the University of California Davis
School of Law (King Hall).

David Gamage

In this edition of Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors discuss
parallels between the recent decisions
in Alabama Department of Revenue v.
CSX and DMA v. Brohl. Although the
authors conclude there is no single
grand theory uniting the two cases,
they note ways the opinions, including a dissent and the concurrences, can
inform readers as to future Court
opinions.

Darien Shanske

Introduction
This Supreme Court term has already featured two important state and local tax decisions, and we have not even
gotten to Wynne v. Comptroller. In this column we provide
some initial reflections1 on Alabama Department of Revenue
v. CSX Transportation Inc.2 and Direct Marketing Association
v. Brohl.3
CSX Transportation Inc.
The background facts of CSX are as follows: Section
11501(b)(4) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) prohibits a state from imposing ‘‘another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier.’’4
Alabama imposes a general sales and use tax that is based on
the value of the item purchased. When railroads purchase
diesel fuel, they must pay the tax. However, two competing
types of businesses — motor carriers (trucks) and interstate
water carriers (ships) — are exempt from paying the sales tax

on their diesel fuel purchases. The motor carriers pay a
different per-gallon excise tax. Ships do not pay the excise
tax; they have been exempt from the sales tax since 1959
because the state believed that the dormant commerce
clause prevented it from imposing the tax.
The two questions before the Court were:
(1) When the statute forbids discrimination, to which
comparison class should the lower courts look? Should the
court read in a comparison class from the immediately
preceding subsections of the 4-R Act (‘‘commercial and
industrial property’’), or did Congress specifically not wish
to include that limitation?
(2) If a court finds facial discrimination, can a state
defend its policies by pointing to the operation of its larger
tax system?
Regarding the comparison class issue, the Court rejected
the limitation on what can constitute the class that was
proposed by Alabama and that had also been proposed by
Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
dissent the last time this case was before the Court.5 The
anti-discrimination provision at issue is in subsection (b)(4),
which does not explicitly define the proper comparison
class. However, subsections (b)(1)-(3) explicitly indicate a
comparison class of commercial and industrial property.
The majority found that this limitation does not carry over
from the first three subsections to the last, primarily because
the earlier subsections were specifically about the property
tax and the final residual provision is not so limited.
Once the Court found that this limitation did not restrict
subsection (b)(4), the question became what constitutes a
comparison class. Here the Court provided only broad
guidance. On the one hand, the analysis of what constitutes
a comparison class cannot be the same as would be performed in connection with the equal protection clause
because, for economic matters, the equal protection clause
permits very fine distinctions. As Justice Antonin Scalia
explained, if this analysis were imported into the 4-R Act, it
‘‘would deprive subsection (b)(4) of all real-world effect,
providing protection that the equal protection clause already provides.’’6 The proper comparison class must take
into account the purpose of the 4-R Act, which is (and here

1

Some of these impressions and ideas were first presented in posts
for SCOTUSBlog and a column for the Daily Journal.
2
No. 13-553, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).
3
No. 13-1032, 575 U.S. ___ (2015).
4
49 U.S.C. section 11501(b)(4).

5

562 U.S. 277 (2011).
Id. at 6.
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Id. at 6 (citing 4-R Act section 101(b)(2)).
Id.
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Id. at 8.
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Id. at 9.
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Id.
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Id. at 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 479-480 (1932).
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See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
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briefs, including in the brief for the United States as amicus
supporting neither party. This is especially significant because the Court’s disposition of this case largely followed
that proposed by the United States in its brief and at oral
argument.
What does it mean that the complementary tax doctrine
made no appearance in the majority opinion? Rather than
reference the doctrine, the Court used a form of the phrase
‘‘rough equivalent’’ twice, along with ‘‘roughly comparable,’’ to describe what the Eleventh Circuit must assess
when comparing the different Alabama taxes. Is this standard stricter or looser than the complementary tax doctrine?
Is this doctrine not mentioned because the Court finds it
unsatisfactory or applicable only to dormant commerce
clause cases?
We think this rough equivalence represents a standard
that is lower than that applied in the recent complementary
tax cases. The complementary tax doctrine has three prongs:
First, a special out-of-state burden must be identified. Second, the out-of-state surcharge must approximate, but not
exceed, the identified burden. Third, the event that triggers
the in-state and out-of-state tax must be ‘‘substantially
equivalent.’’15 To be sure, just reviewing the three prongs,
the complementary tax doctrine could be essentially the
same as asking whether two taxes are ‘‘roughly comparable.’’
Nevertheless, we think the Court’s rhetoric and at least one
recent decision indicate the complementary tax doctrine is
stricter than just asking about rough comparability.
In Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, the Court
explained, ‘‘Under our cases, unless one of several narrow
bases of justification is shown . . . actual discrimination,
wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude
and scope of the discrimination have no bearing on the
determinative question of whether discrimination has occurred.’’16 If the magnitude and scope are irrelevant, how
can rough equivalence suffice?
The facts of Lohman indicate that this strictness is not
mere rhetoric. In Lohman, Missouri imposed a 1.5 percent
average use tax at the state level to compensate for the sales
tax imposed by some 1,000 localities. The Court found that
this added use tax violated prong two of the complementary
tax doctrine — a statewide average did not eliminate the
discrimination happening on all of the transactions on
which imported goods were charged more than local goods.
This was so even though, by necessity, any discrimination
evened out across the state and was arguably roughly equivalent. This is not to say that Lohman cannot be distinguished,
just that it is one example of a line of cases that apply the
complementary tax doctrine in a way not obviously consistent with the roughly equivalent standard.

15
See, e.g., Oregon Waste Systems Inc. v. Dep’t of Environmental
Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 103 (1994).
16
511 U.S. 641, 644 (1994).

State Tax Notes, May 11, 2015

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616561

(C) Tax Analysts 2015. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

the opinion cites the purpose of the statute) to ‘‘restore the
financial stability of the railway system of the United States,
[while] foster[ing] competition among all carriers by railroad and other modes of transportation.’’7 Given this purpose, the Court agreed that competitors, such as motor
carriers, can be an appropriate comparison class. As for other
possible comparison classes, the Court put that question to
the side, stating that ‘‘sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof.’’8
Regarding proper discrimination analysis, the Court explained that ‘‘it does not accord with ordinary English usage
to say that a tax discriminates against a rail carrier if a rival
who is exempt from that tax must pay another comparable
tax from which the rail carrier is exempt.’’9 In other words,
how can there be unlawful discrimination if in reality the
railroads were no worse off than their competitors? The
Court therefore ‘‘could not approve’’ the Eleventh Circuit’s
refusal to consider Alabama’s argument that its fuel excise
tax is the ‘‘rough equivalent’’ of its sales tax on diesel fuels.10
Though the Court was ‘‘inclined to agree’’ that this is not the
kind of analysis that courts are likely to do well, it is
nevertheless the duty of courts to try, because that is the task
Congress assigned to the courts ‘‘by drafting an antidiscrimination command in such sweeping terms.’’11
Both for the questions of comparison class and the scope
of analysis, Scalia’s opinion adopted a statutory interpretation that requires courts to apply broad standards. Thomas’s
dissent does more than argue for his reading of the statute;
he also needles the majority about reaching a ‘‘predictably
unworkable’’ result.12
We have one observation about this case on its own
terms, and another comment about this case in comparison
to DMA. First, the dormant commerce clause also forbids
discrimination in taxation, and thus the Court has already
analyzed what constitutes discrimination in taxation at
some length. Also, in the dormant commerce clause cases, as
briefly noted in the opinion, the Court has long accepted
the possibility that states can defend themselves from a
charge of discriminatory taxation by showing that there is
some other compensating tax. By referring back to a dormant commerce clause case from 1932,13 the majority opinion appears to accept that this piece of conceptual analysis is
sound. Yet a lot has happened since 1932. In particular, the
Court developed the so-called complementary tax doctrine,
complete with its own three-part test, which has been applied fairly recently.14 The doctrine was discussed in the
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The background facts are as follows: Generally speaking,
the Colorado statute at issue in DMA v. Brohl requires that
out-of-state vendors that do not need to collect the use tax
(because of Quill17) must provide their customers with a
notice that the customers owe the use tax and requires that
the retailers report the amount of individual Colorado residents’ purchases to the Department of Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA; 28
U.S.C. section 1341), does not bar a federal court from
enjoining the operation of this statute because enjoining this
reporting obligation does ‘‘not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.’’
The Court reasoned that the TIA must be understood on
the basis of the federal Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which in
turn is interpreted in light of federal tax law. Notice requirements occur before assessments in the federal code and are
therefore not covered by the TIA. Case closed.18
Full disclosure: We worked on an amicus brief taking
Colorado’s side in this case, so we are in a good position —
perhaps too good — to take a critical look on its reasoning.
Consider the following: In CSX, seven justices, including
Scalia, the author of CSX, accepted the premise that the 4-R
Act was to be interpreted broadly, consistent with its purpose, even if this meant that courts would be tasked with
applying broad standards. Thomas dissented in CSX, explaining how a word-by-word analysis of the 4-R Act could
produce an easier-to-apply rule, a rule consistent with a
narrower construal of the act’s purposes — namely, protecting railroads from discrimination relative to all other businesses. Nevertheless, in DMA, a unanimous Court, in an
opinion written by Thomas, eschewed looking at the
broader purpose of the TIA and embraced a technical reading that provides a seemingly easy-to-apply rule. What
changed? Presumably Thomas believes that he applied the
same interpretive method to resolve both cases. Indeed, one
might have thought that the TIA, with its implications for
federalism, would have merited the broader treatment.
There are several clues to resolving these riddles in the
majority and concurring opinions. First, regarding federalism concerns, one must remember that they are considered
so important that the Court has not found them to be fully
encapsulated by the TIA. Rather, the TIA is only a partial
codification of long-standing comity concerns that should
guide courts and which guided the Supreme Court as recently as Levin v. Commerce Energy in 2010.19

17

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
Maybe. DMA, which limits the protection of the TIA (and
seemingly the federal AIA), may well be reconsidered sooner rather
than later because of unanticipated consequences. See, e.g., Marie
Sapirie, ‘‘The Effect of Direct Marketing Association,’’ State Tax Notes,
Mar. 30, 2015, p. 780.
19
560 U.S. 413 (2010).
18
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Regarding comity concerns, the Court in DMA did not
reach the issue. Thus, the broad argument for a federal court
to stay its hand regarding Colorado’s statute has not been
fully weighed. And it seems plausible that the Court would
be unwilling to shield all novel tax collection statutes using
the TIA while also being open to permitting this particular
statute to be shielded from federal court interference because of comity considerations. After all, this statute is
arguably not very burdensome and is addressing an urgent
fiscal matter. Further, this is a curious circumstance in which
the Tenth Circuit can already point to the adequate remedy
having been provided to the DMA by state courts. That said,
whether Colorado will be able to win on the issue is quite
another matter, because the state did not argue comity
before the lower courts. But we think other states should not
be so quick to abandon making a comity argument.
The second reason to consider that the holding of DMA
is narrow is that the court repeats twice that it is interpreting
the statute in a rigid manner that favors ‘‘clear boundaries’’
because it is a jurisdictional statute. The implication being
that a different interpretive rubric might have otherwise
been appropriate.
Finally, there is Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Ginsburg
emphasizes that the Colorado statute imposed a notice
requirement on a party that, by definition, was not obligated
to remit the tax.20 If a party that did have such an obligation,
for instance an employer obligated to withhold, were to
challenge a similar reporting requirement, then this would
be a different case. In other words, Colorado’s reporting
statute lost the protection of the TIA for the very reason it
was instituted to begin with — the entities that need to
report the use tax obligation cannot be compelled to collect
the tax themselves.
This brings us to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence, which takes direct aim at Quill. Naturally, this concurrence has received a great deal of attention. Regarding
this extraordinary concurrence, we have three observations.
First, Kennedy’s critique of Quill in part tracked the
opinions of courts below and commentators who have
urged that Quill is to be read narrowly.21 For instance,
Kennedy emphasized the degree to which Quill was upheld
on the grounds of stare decisis and that the decision itself
contains limiting language. When lower courts have accepted this reasoning, they have done so in cases that, in
effect, limited Quill. These decisions limit Quill to the use
tax context and do not apply it to the corporate income tax.

20

DMA, slip op. at 1-2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Compare DMA, slip op. at 2 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (‘‘In other
words, the Quill majority acknowledged the prospect that its conclusion was wrong when the case was decided’’) with Tax Comm’r of State
v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W.Va. 2006); John A.
Swain, ‘‘State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective,’’ 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 319 (2003).
21
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For another option for how Quill might be interpreted so as to
narrow and limit its impact, see Gamage and Devin J. Heckman,
‘‘Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce,’’ 92 B.U. L.
Rev. 483 (2012).
23
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
24
533 U.S. 194 (2001).
25
DMA, slip op. at 3 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (‘‘It is unwise to
delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court’s holding in Quill. A
case questionable even when decided, Quill now harms States to a
degree far greater than could have been anticipated earlier’’).
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down? A state would be in that position if it also had a
statute on the books requiring sellers without physical presence to collect use tax as soon as imposing that obligation is
constitutionally permissible. California has such a statute,
and Colorado arguably does as well.26
Suppose Colorado does indeed have such a statute. In
that case, if, for example, on remand, the Tenth Circuit were
to proceed to the merits of Colorado’s case, then whichever
side wins, there could be a vehicle for the Court to reconsider Quill because Colorado would directly benefit from an
alternative holding overturning Quill and the Court could
direct the parties to address the question whether Quill
should be overturned.27 Of course, assuming Kennedy’s
concerns are shared by a majority on the Court, a less
dramatic solution could be to just uphold Colorado’s statute
on the merits.
Conclusion
Ultimately, we do not think there is a single grand theory
explaining CSX and DMA. Nevertheless, we do think it is
significant that the Court adopted such different approaches to two federal statutes, because this indicates that
the particular content and context of the statutes drove the
choice of interpretive rubric. Both decisions are notable in
not only failing to resolve a major issue in state and local
taxation, but actually unsettling such issues. In the case of
Alabama Dep’t of Revenue v. CSX, we have the prospect of
reconsideration of the complementary tax doctrine. DMA v.
Brohl directly implicates the interpretation of the TIA and
AIA, does not address the interpretation of the comity
doctrine at all, and (most strikingly) through Kennedy’s
concurrence indicates that the Court may, at long last, be
willing to reconsider Quill.
✰

26
Cal. Rev. & Tax Code section 6203(c); Colo. Rev. Stat. section
39-26-102(3). Washington is considering a similar statute; see Jordan
Schrader, ‘‘Washington Covets Online Sales Tax Revenue, May Take
the Risk of Budgeting for It,’’ The News Tribune, Apr. 4, 2015.
27
Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (‘‘As noted, the
Court of Appeals followed the Saucier procedure [that was then
required]. The Saucier procedure has been criticized by Members of
this Court and by lower court judges, who have been required to apply
the procedure in a great variety of cases and thus have much firsthand
experience bearing on its advantages and disadvantages. Accordingly,
in granting certiorari, we directed the parties to address the question
whether Saucier should be overruled’’).
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If the Tenth Circuit were moved by Kennedy’s reasoning,
and given that it cannot overturn Quill, one sensible option
would be for the Tenth Circuit to accept Colorado’s contention that the strict Quill rule should not be expanded to
apply to a notice and reporting requirement.22
Second, Kennedy outlined the argument for overturning
Quill by appealing to a recent case that also overturned
relatively recent precedent. That 2009 case, Pearson v. Callahan,23 is, in our opinion, an interesting analogy. In Pearson, the Court unanimously overturned the order of analysis
it had established for adjudicating some section 1983 suits.
That order had been established by a 2001 opinion, Saucier
v. Katz, which was written by Kennedy.24 The Saucier ordering rule was reasonable, but always vulnerable to the critique
that it was overly rigid, and experience confirmed the critique. Kennedy argued that as with Quill, the initial conceptual analysis was always questionable as being rigid. Experience has confirmed that critique. And, more dramatically
than in Pearson, the demonstration of the problems with
Quill has come by means of an epochal change in the
structure of our economy.25
Finally, there’s Kennedy’s somewhat puzzling conclusion: ‘‘The legal system should find an appropriate case for
this Court to reexamine Quill.’’ What is Kennedy asking
for? A challenge to New York’s ‘‘Amazon’’ law was just before
the Court in the fall of 2013, and the Court denied a
petition for certiorari. Here is one possible problem that
might have concerned Kennedy: New York’s Amazon law,
which established nexus through in-state affiliates, was designed to satisfy the Quill test. The briefing largely addressed
whether New York’s statute was true to Quill. Perhaps what
a state needs to argue is that its Amazon law is true to Quill
and that, further, Quill should be overturned.
This raises another question: Would a state directly benefit from overturning Quill if its Amazon law were struck

